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PEOPLE v. HOYT

[20 C. (2d)

advise the jury that after its assessment of the penalty its
duty was ended. The court's remarks were entirely prop<>r.
(People v. Ramos, 3 Cal. (2d) 269, 273 [44 P. (2d) 301];
People v. Bruno, 49 Cal. App. 372, 376-379 [193 Pac. 511].)
[11] Nor do wc find anything of a prejudicial character
in the conduct of the prosecuting attorney. Many of the matters complained of are trivial and such as frequently occur
in the trial of conteSted cases. Some of the remarks in the
closing argument castigated the appellants, singly or as a
group, but in so doing counsel cannot be said to have transcended the. rules of propriety. Reasonable inferences may
be drawn from the evidence by counsel in the eourse of argument. (People v. Burdg, 95 Cal. App. 259, 269 [272 Pac.
816].) [12] Moreover, the question whether counsel prejudicially overstepped the bounds of propriety is a matter
lar~ely within the discretion of the trial court. (People v.
Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 621-622 [45 Pac. 860] ; People v. Hanks,
35 Cal. App. (2d) 290,302-303 [95 P. (2d) 478].)
[13] The final contention concerns the impanelment of
the jury. It is urged that the trial court improperly allowed
a departure from the order prescribed by section 1088 of the
Penal Code for the exercise of peremptory challenges. The
assignment is unavailing in the absence of a showing of prejudice to appellants' substantial rights. (People v. Hickman,
204 Cal. 470, 481 [268 Pac. 909, 270 Pac. 1117]; People v.
Troutman, 187 Cal. 313, 320 [201 Pac. 928].) [14] Certain
of the appellants also object to the scope of interrogation pursued' by prosecuting counsel in the course of the voir dire
examination wherein on occasions a prospective juror was
asked whether in the event he was "satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt· and to a moral certainty that five defendants
would be guilty of murder in the first degree," he had "ahy
conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty as to the defendant that didn't actually participate in
the killing of Ferrari f" Under the circumstances existing
at· the time, the query was permissible and an answer in the
affirmative furnished sufficient basis for the court's allowance
of.a challenge for cause. (Penal Code, § 1074, subd. 8.)
What has been· said sufficiently disposes of all contentions
requiring discussion. From a consideration of the. whole record, it is our opinion that as to the appellants Hoyt, Arnold
and Frazier, no prejudicial error was committed in the rulings of the court and that all questions of fact involved were
~ubmitted .w the jury under proper instructions..
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For the reasons herein stated, the judgments and the order
denying motions for a new trial are affirmed as to appellants
Hoyt, Arnold and Frazier. As to the appellant Tosi, the
judgment and order denying new trial are reversed.
Appellant Hoyt's petition for a rehearing was denied May
28,1942.

[L. A. No. 16964. In Bank. May 1, 1942.J

RANCHO SANTA ANITA, INC., Appellant, V •. CITY OF
ARCADIA (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent.

~

[1] Statutes-Enactment-By Reference-E:ffect of Subsequent
Changes in Law Referred to.-Where one statute incorporates
another by specific reference to the title, the latter is incorporated as it then exists, not as it is subsequently modified.
This rule applies to an ordinance providing that "all provisions of title IX of the Political Code ... in regard to revenue and taxation which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this ordinance shall ... govern all matters of revenue
and taxation."
[2], Taxation-Power-Legislative Character.-The taxing power
of a city and all limitations thereon are derived from the Constitution and statutes.
[3a,3b] Id.-Levy-Rate.-Const., art XI, § 12, does not preclude
a city from acquiring by taxation more funds than are necessary for the expenditures of any given year. In the absence
of a constitutional or statutory requirement that the tax rate
conform to estimated budgetary e'xpenditures, a city council
is free to levy a tax that will yield a surplus.
[4] Id.-Power-Legislative Character-Judicial Review.-In the
absence of constitutional or statutory limitations, the amount
of revenue necessary for the needs of a municipality is within
[2] See 24 Cal. Jur. 43.
[4] See 24 Cal. Jur. 43-46.
t
McK. Dig. References: [1] Statutes, § 79; [2, 4] Taxation, § 8;
[3] Taxation, §215; [5] Municipal Corporations, § 187; [6]' Municipal Corporations, § 165•
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the sole discretion of the legislative authorities, and thi" discretion is not subject to judicial interference.
[5] Municipal Corporations-Bonds-Taxes.-In the Municipal
Bond Act of 1901, § 7 (Stats. 1901, p. 27; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1937, Act 517E), the provision that the city must levy a tax
sufficient to meet the annual interest and principal payments
on bonds is a minimum, not a maximum, requirement. Where
the taxes that go into the various bond interest and sinking
funds do not exceed the entire unpaid balance of principal
and interest due from each fund, they are not excessive in
amount, even if, taking account of cash on hand and delinquent tax payments, they yield more than the amount necessary to meet the annual interest and principal payments.
[6] ld. - Fiscal Matters -" Transfer of Funds. - The Municival
Bond Act of 1901, § 7, providing in part that the taxes levied
shall be used for no other purpose than the payment of bonds
and interest, ~s not violated by an appropriation from bond
funds to a water fund of the alliount advanced from it to the
bond funds.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Robert W. Kenny, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover a portion of taxes paid. Judgment of
dismissal, following the sustaining of a demurrer to the complaint without leave to arr.end, affirmed.
Stater & Dawson and Williamson, Hoge, Sargent & Judson
for Appellant.
James C. Bone, City Attorney, and Burke, Hickson, Burke
& Marshall for Respondent.

J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, and S. V. O. Prichard,
Assistant County Counsel, as Amici Curiae, on behalf of
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Arcadia, a city of the sixth class, levies and
colle'cts its own taxes by virtue of section 871 of the Municipal Corporations Act. (Stats.1883, p. 93; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1937, Act 5233, § 871.) In 1913 the city council adopted an Ofdinance providing: " All provisions of Title IX of the Political
Code of the State of California in regard to revenue and taxation which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordi-

nance shall apply to and govern all matters of revenue and
taxation which are not herein specifically provided for, substituting where necessary the proper city officer for any county
officer therein referred to." At that time section 3714 of the
Political Code, included within title IX, provided: "The
Board of Supervisors of each county must, on the third Monday in September, fix the rate of county taxes, designating
the number of cents on each one hundred dollars of property
levied for each fund, and must levy the state and county
taxes upon the taxable property of the county; provided, that
it shall not be lawful for any Board of Supcrvisors of any
county in the state to levy, nor shall any tax greater than
fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of property be levied
and collected in anyone year, to pay the bonded indebtedness,
or judgment arising therefrom, of this state, or of any county
or municipality of this state.' 'Subsequent amendments, extending the section to six and one-half pages, require each
county board of supervisors to adopt a budget and to levy
taxes in accordance with the budgetary requirements after
all cash on hand and lllcoming revenues have been applied
toward meeting the necessary expenditures .
•'
In 1937 the City Council of Arcadia adopted a budget that
set forth the estimated cxpenditures for the ensuing fiscal
year, and the taxes levied by the city for that fiscal year
went into the general fund, the library fund, and the bond
funds. Plaintiff, an Arcadian landowner, paid its taxes under
protest, and when its claim for refund was denied, brought
this action in the superior court to recover a portion of the
taxes. The defendant city's demurrer was sustained without
leave to amend, and plaintiff has appealed from the judgment
of dismissal.
Plaintiff contends that the taxes paid by it under the 1937
levy were illegal because the city council failed to consider
available cash on hand and other revenue in fixing the tax
rate. '1'he complaint alleged that in view of these revenues
the tax rate as fixed by the council yielded almost double the
amount necessary to meet the estimated expenditures for the
general and library fund and the bond obligations. Plaintiff
also contcnds that appropriations and tax levies were made
in five of the bond interest and sinking funds for purposes
not authorized by law.
[1] Title IX of the Political Codc is concerned only with
20 C. (2dl-ll
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state and county taxation and therefore does not apply to the
,defendant city except insofar as it is incorporated by reference into the city ordinantJe of 1913. The provisions restricting the amount of taxes to budgetary requirements were added
to the Political Code subsequent to the passage of that ordinance. Plaintiff contends that the ordinance incorporated
title IX not only as it then existed but as afterwards revised.
It is not necessary to decide whether the city council had the
constitutional authority to adopt unknown, future enactments of the state Legislature because the ordinance makes
clear the council's intention to adopt article IX only ilB it
then existed. When one statute incorporates the provisions
of another by a specific reference to the title, the latter is
incorporated as it then exists and not as it is subsequently
modified. (Ramish v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443 [58 Pac. 920] ;
Vallejo etc. R. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 177 Cal. 249 [170
Pac. 426] ; Thoits v. Byxbee, 34 Cal. App. 226 [167 Pac. 166] ;
Culver v. The People, 161 Ill. 89 [43 N. E. 812]. See San Luis
Obispo v. Pettit, 87 Cal. 499 [25 Pac. 694] ; In re Yick W0,
68 Cal. 294 [9 Pac. 139, 58 Am. St. Rep. 12] ; 2 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, (2d ed.) 787-789; and cases cited in
59 C. J. 1060.) The 1913 ordinance refers specifically to
title IX of the Political Code and makes no reference to
subsequent modifications. The defendant city was therefore
not required to comply with those provisions of title IX
adopted after 1913.
[2] Plaintiff maintains, however, that even if defendant
is not bound by the amended provisions of section 3714, the
failure of the city council to tll;ke into account cash on hand
and incoming revenues in fixing the taxes rendered the latter illegal. The taxing power of the city and all limitations
thereon are derived from the Constitution and statutes. Article XI, section 12 of the Constitution provides: "Except as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the legislature shall
have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or
other public or municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other
municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the
corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect
taxes for such purposes." Pursuant to this section the Legislature enacted the Municipal Corporation Law, section 862.11
of which authorizes a city of the sixth class "To levy and
collect annually a property tax, which shall not, without the
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assent of two~thirds of the qualified electors of such city vot. ing at an election to be held for that purpose,: exceed one dollar
on each hllndred dollars .... " (Stats. 1935, p.2070; Deering's
Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5233, § 862.11.) Section 871 of the same
statute provides that" The city council shall have the power,
and it shall be its duty, to provide by ordinance a system for
the assessment, levy and collection of all city taxes not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter. Nothing herein shall
prevent the city council from exercising the power granted by
the general laws of the State relative to the assessment and collection of taxes by county officers." (Stats. 1883, p. 93; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5233, § 871.) Other sections provide
for the collection of license fees, street poll taxes,fines, penalties, and forfeitures; impose debt limitations; and require the
city clerk to prepare an annual summary of receipts and disbursements for the past fiscal year. (Stats. 1883, p. 93; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5333, §§ 862.12, 862.9, 873, 878.) At
the time of the levy in question, there was no constitutional or
statutory requirement that the defendant city prepare a budget
or estimate its expenditures for an ensuing fiscal year, that incoming revenues and cash on hand be deducted from anticipated
expenditures, or that the tax be levied only for an amount
..":' sufficient to produce the difference between estimated expenditures and cash on hand plus anticipated income.
[Sa] Article XI, 'section 12 of the Constitution quoted
above provides that the taxing power conferred upon cities
by the Legislature may be exercised, only for municipal' purposes, but this limitation does not require a city to spend all
its tax funds during the year for which they are collected.
So long as the funds are ultimately utilized for a municipal
purpose, the city is free to acquire by taxation more funds
than are necessary for the expenditures of any given year
and thereby to accumulate a surplus available for municipal
expenditures or for purposes of tax reduction in later years.
(Compare Rev. & Tax. Code, § 4806.)
[4] In the absence of constitutional or statutory limitations the amount of revenue necessary for the needs of a
municipality is within the sole discretion of the legislative
authorities and this discretion is not subject to judicial interference. (See cases cited in 24 Cal. Jur. 43-46, §§ 26, 27. See
Stull v. De Mattos, 23 Wash. 71 [62 Pac. 451, 51 L. R. A.
892].) "The power of courts to interfere in matters of taxa• • .i~'~~\i')
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tion, except as permitted by statute, is limited. The courts
cannot pass upon the question of the policy of a tax law or
the expediency of the exercise of the taxing body or the wisdom or fairness of the method of distributing the burden of
taxation where no provision of the Constitution is violated."
(4 Cooley, Taxation, (4th ed.) p. 3220.)
[3b] The fact that the city council did adopt a budget
setting forth estimated expenditures for the ensuing year did
not oblige the council to levy taxes at a rate that would yield
no more than was necessary to meet such expenditures. Since
there was no constitutional or statutory requirement that the
tax rate conform to estimated budgetary expenditures, the
council was free to levy a tax that would yield a surplus. The
economic and social considerations that underlie such a course
of action are properly subject to legislative discretion rather
than to judicial review.
In the case of Otis v. Los Angeles CO~tnty, 9 Cal. (2d) 366
[70 P. (2d) 633J, cited by plaintiff, a tax levy was held invalid because the county had violated Political Code section
3714. Since the defendant city is not governed by that section,
the case does not apply to the present situation. Madary v.
City of Fresno, 20 Cal. App. 91 [128 Pac. 340], and Redman
v. Warden, 92 Cal. App. 636 [268 Pac. 686], are also distinguishable from the instant case. In the Madary case a tax- .
payer was permitted to recover a portion of his taxes when
the State Board of Equalization increased assessed property
valuations after the city had fixed its tax rate on the basis
of the old valuations. The increased valuations resulted in
the collection of a much higher tax than the city had intended
to levy. In the Redman case a tax levy was held invalid
because part of the property in the tax district was omitted
from the levy, thereby increasing the tax burden upon the
remainder of the property in the district. In the present case
the city intended to levy the taxes in question, and there was
no discrimination against any taxpayer. In the case of Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angdes County, 15 Cal. (2d) 1
[97 P. (2d) 963J, this court upheld the validity of section
3804.1 of the Political Code which denies the right to recover
taxes levied at an excessive rate in violation of Political Code
section 3714, when the taxes arc used in a succeeding year to
reduce the tax levy or applied for a public purpose, thereby
indicating that there are no constitutional limitations upon

~';
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the right of a city to levy taxes in excess of current fiscal
requirements.
The taxes that went into bond interest and sinking funds
were levied under the authority of the Municipal Bond Act of
1901 (Stats. 1901, p. 27; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act
5178), section 7 of which provides: "The legislative branch
of said city, town or municipaltiy shall at the time of fixing
the general tax levy, and in the manner for such general tax
levy provided, levy and collect annually each year until said
bonds are paid, Or until there shall be a sum in the treasury
of said city, town or municipality set apart for that purpose
to meet all sums coming due for principal and interest on
such bonds, a tax sufficient to pay the annual interest bn
such bonds, and also such part of the principal thereof as
shall become due before the time for fixing the next general
tax levy. Provided, however, that if the maturity of the in_
debtedness created by the issue of bonds be made to begin
more' than one year after the date of the issuance ,of such
bonds, such tax shall be levied and collected at the time and
in the manner aforesaid annually each year, sufficient to pay
the interest on such indebtedness a.s it falls due, and also
to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal
thereof on or before maturity. The taxes herein required to
be levied and collected shall be in addition to all other taxes
levied for municipal purposes, and shall be collected at the
time and in the same manner as other municipal taxes are
collected, and be used for no other purpose than the payment
of said bonds and accruing interest."
[5] Plaintiff contends that under this section taxes levied
by the defendant city for the paymenfof interest and principal on bonds may not yield more than is necessary to meet
the interest and principal payments accruing during the year
for which the levy is made. The provision in the section, however, that the city must levy a tax sufficient to meet the
annual interest and principal payments on bonds is a minimum, not a maximum; requirement. The city must levy at
least enough taxes in any given year to meet the annual in"
terest and principal require~ents, but it may, in itsdiscretion, levy sufficient tuxes to meet in whole or in part thebalance of the bond issue, including both principal and interest.
Its latitude in this regard is evident from the fact that no
further taxes need be levied when there is a sum in the city

f
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treasury set apart to meet all sums coming due for principal
and interest on the bonds, and there is no restriction upon
the right of the council to create this fund. Likewise, there
is no restriction upon the amount that may be placed in the
sinking fund to meet future principal payments on bonds
that begin to mature more than one year after' the date of
issuance. Since the taxes that went into the various bond
interest and sinking funds did not exceed the entire unpaid
balance of principal and interest due from each fund, they
were not excessive in amount even if, taking account of cash
on hand and delinquent tax payments, they yielded more
than was necessary to meet the annual interest and principal
payments.

I

!

f

f

[6] Included within the budget adopted by the city council was an appropriation from five of the bond funds of an
amount owed to the water fund. Plaintiff contends that this
appropriation and the taxes levied to meet it are in violation
of the. last part of the section quoted above providing that
"the taxes herein required to be levied and collected shall be
... used for no other purpose than the payment of said bonds
and accruing interest." The appropriation, however, simply
provided for the repayment to the water fund of sums advanced from it to the bond funds. There is no allegation in
the complaint that the sums advanced from the water fund
were used for any purpose other than the payment of bond
principal and interest. In effect the sums appropriated were
used to pay bond principal and interest by repaying the
advances made from the water fund for this purpose.
The judgment is affirmed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting._I agree with the conclusion
that the ordinance of the city of Arcadia did not require the
city council to follow the requirements of section 3714 of the
Political Code in levying its assessment for the fiscal year
1937-38 but, in my opinion, the allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint clearly show that the council levied taxes at a rate
designed to produce more revenue than was required for
governmental purposes during the ensuing fiscal year and that
such levy is void as to the excess.
In considering the validity of a tax levy, the courts will

May 1942]
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consider two important elements: (1) whether the power exists to make the levy; and, (2) whether:that power has been
exercised within statutory limitations. "The authority of
the judiciary is confined to an inquiry into the jurisdictional
question, and if it appears that the poiitical· or legislative
body has kept within the limits onts authority, the judiciary
must pause there and admit its incompetency to inquire into
wrongs which, within those limits may have been committed."
(San Christina etc. Co. v. San Francisco, 167 Cal. 762 [141
Pac. 384, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 676] ; 4 Cooley's Taxation, 4th ed.,
p. 3218.) Unlike the sovereign state, counties and other municipal subdivisions possess no inherent power of taxation.
The Constitution itself does not grant them the taxing power,'
but the Legislature is authorized to ". . .by general laws,
vest' in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess
and collect taxes... !, for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes. (Const. art. XI, § 12.) Pursuant to this
constitutional authority, the Legislature has authorized the
council of a city of the sixth class "To levy and collect annually a property tax, which shall not, without the assent of
two-thirds of the qualified electors of such city voting at an
.... election to be held for that purpose exceed one dollar on each
'. one hundred dollars.... " (Stats. 1935, p. 2070; Deering's
Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5233, § 862.11.)
By the same statute, "The city council shall have the power,
and it shall be its duty, to provide by ordinance a system for
the assessment, levy and collection of all city taxes not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter. Nothing herein
shall prevent the city council from exercising the power
granted by general laws of the state relative to the assessment
and collection of taxes by county officers." (§ 871.)
The specifically mentioned general limitations upon municipal power to tax are (1) that the municipal levy 'be
annual; (2) that in the absence of special election, the maximum levy shall not exceed one dollar for each one hundred
dollars assessed value; and (3) that a system shall be established by ordinance for the assessment, levy and collection
of such taxes.
But in addition to these express provisions is the limitation
inherent in the nature of the taxing power itself, that is,
public necessity. "Taxes are defined to be burdens or charges
imposed by the legislative power upon persons or property,
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to raise money for pUhlic purposes. The power to tax rests
upon necessity, and is inherent in every sovereignty."
(Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, vol. 2, 8th ed., p. 986.)
And as an eminent authority on municipal corporation law
has stated: " ... the suhstantial foundation of the power is
political, civil, or governmental necessity.... " (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, vol. 4, 5th ed., pp. 2313, 2314.)
This inherent limitation upon the taxing power of municipal corporations has been recognized by the courts of this
state and stated in one case as follows: "The power of government to exact from the citizen a part of his property in
way of taxation is indeed vast, but it is not unlimited. It may
be exereised only for the public good and for a publie purpose.
"Cooley's definition of taxes as 'enforced contribution
levied for public needs' states eoneisely both the nature and
limitation of taxes. Taxes are the property of the eitizens
demanded and taken by the government to enable it to discharge its funetions. In his work on Tax Titles, Blackwell
defines taxes as (burdens imposed by the legislative power
upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes.'
"The needs of the government constitute then both the
occasion and limitation of the taxing power. To take from the
citizen a dollar beyond the needs of government is not taxation; it is extortion." (Madary v. City of Fresno, 20 Cal.
App. 91, 97[128 Pac. 340, 343].)
In a more recent case, the county of Los Angeles contended
that a levy which produced considerably more money than its.
budget requirements was not pro tanto invalid in the absence
of arbitrary or capricious action. Following the Madary case
and Redman v. Warden, 92 Cal. App. 636 [268 Pac. 686], this
court decided to the contrary and held that where the taxing
body, either through inadvertence or design, excludes from
its computations amounts which will be available to the municipality during the period then being provided for, an excessive levy resulting from 811ch action is invalid. (Otis v.
Los Angeles County, 9 Cal. (2d) 366 [70 P. (2d) 633].)
Although that determination was reached in an attack upon
an assessment which was levied in a county operating under
the provisions of section 3714 of the Political Code, the reasoning of the court is applicable to the present controversy. All
of the authorities support the rule that where there has been
an . official determination of governmental need by the legis-

lativebody, an assessment levied at a rate which will produce
a return substantially in excess of that previously determined
need is, to the extent of that excess, invalid. As stated in
Madary v. City of Fresno, supra, at p. 98, and approved in
Otis v. Los Angeles County, "It seems eminently just that
this money collected by the city in excess of its needs as
determined by the constituted authorities,should be returned
to those upon whom the unnecessary burden was imposed, and
no merely technical objection should stand in the way."
As the basis of its cause of action, the appellant in the
present action alleged: "That the needs and requirements
of the city general fund, being the fund for current operating
expenses and general government purposes, for the fiscal year
1937-1938 was the sum of $141,061.14; that thi· taxing officials
and taxing body of said eity determined and fixed such needs,
requirements and appropriations in such amount on or about
the 7th day of September, 1937; that on said date resolution
No. 878 of the city of Arcadia, entitled," A resolution of the
city council of the city of Arcadia adopting budget for the
fiscal year 1937-1938,' was adopted and by such 'resolution
therJ.eeds, requirements and appropriations for said fund f{)r
..~ said fiscal year were fixed and determined in the aforesaid
. amount of $141,061.14.. . ." . This resolution constituted
the official determination of thc city's governmental need, as
specified in a budget; so far as its current operating expenses
and general governmental purposes were concerned, entirely
independent of any unappropriated money in its treasury, and
there is no basis for any judicial implication that the, council
considered the cash on hand as a necessary reserve. Such an
implication would invade the discretion vested in the city
council.
The complaint also includes these additional facts upon
which the appellant relies: '''That at the beginning of said
fiscal'year there was cash on hand on deposit in the designated
Uepositorics, belonging to the' credit of said fund for said
fiscal yCllr, hi the sum of $92,720.13; that there were no legal
yltlidontstanding claims, warrants, liabilities or obligations
against s:lid cash or fund balance . . . that the said cash or
fundb~iJance was available for the purpose of meeting the
said }ippropriations, needs or requirements aforesaid ... that
at the beginning- of said fiscal year, as well as at the time of
levying said tax, the taxing officials of said city knew and

or
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were charged with knowledge of such cash or fund balance,
and knew and were charged with knowledge of the availability
thereof to meet the said needs, requirements and appropriations aforesaid; that, howe~er, the said cash or fund balance
was not considered either in the adoption of said budget nor
in the computation, fixing and levying of said tax, but was
arbitrarily omitted."
Other allegations of the complaint are that there was miscellaneous income and revenUE belonging to said fund for the
fiscal year in question of $56,334.58, against which there were
no outstanding obligations, warrants or liabilities. And the
appellant has pleaded that no part of the cash on hand or the
miscellaneous income and revenue was considered either in
the adoption of the budget or, in the computation of the tux
rate.
The doctrine that taxation is based upon necessity rejects
the authority of the legislative body to accumulate unnecessary
surpluses from taxes collected by municipal corporations, and
requires that they confine their levies to the amounts actually
needed to be determined annually. (People v. Baltimore &;
O. R. 00., (1941) 376 Ill. 393 [33 N. E. (2d) 604, 605].) This
principle was recognized in Stuart Arms 00. v. San Francisco, 203 Cal. 150 [263 Pac. 218], where the court, in effect,
held that any excess funds collected during one fiscal year
should be carried over into the next fiscal year and considered
in the computation fixing the rate for such year. The controversy decided by that case arose in connection with the
levy made by the city and county of San Francisco for the
fiscal year 1925-1926. At that time there were no mandatory
budget provisions in section 3714 of the Political Code. Since
two and one-half fiscal years had intervened subsequent to
the filing of the action, said this court, the question was moot
by lapse of time. "If there was an excess for the year
1925-1926 the presumption is that it was carried over into
the next year and entered into the computation of the fixing
of the rate for said following year. No presumption of irregularity or failure to perform official duty may be indulged
against municipal or public officers."
The Supreme Court of Washington has also held taxing
authorities to the same rule, saying: "It is to be considered
also that, apart from the creation of sinking funds to meet
outstanding funded obligations, there is no need for the accumulation of a surplus, since the resource of taxation is
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always available within the limitations fixed by law to meet
the current needs of the county. In' short, any considerable
surplus represents money taken from the' taxpayer in 'advance
of its need." ( Weyerhaeuser Timber 00. v. Roessler,2Wn.
(2d) 304,311 [97 P. (2d) 1070,1073,126 A.L. R. 882,886].)
Accepting the determination of the city council as to the
gross amount required for general and library purpoSes during the fiscal year, so far as the complaint shows, there is no
reason why the unappropriated money and incoming revenues
should not have been taken into consideration by the city
council in fixing the tax rate. Reserves are justified by sound
business practices and recognized by law~ But' for a municipality to tax its citizens for the purposes of government while
having in its treasury unappropriated Inoney' available to
meet its needs and revenues presently available is economically
unsound and governmentally unjust.
..
Turning to the allegations relating to the levy' for bond
purposes, it appears that the city has six bond issues outstanding and maintains a separate fund for the payment of
interest and principal payments accruing on each of them.
The complaint sets out in detail the amount of cash in each
of these funds and the incoming revenue creditable during the
..~ fiscal year 1937-1938. According to the complaint, neither the
cash nor the incoming revenue was considered by the city
council in fixing the tax levy and, for the reasons which have
been stated, the appellant's complaint, in Iny opinion, states a
good cause of action upon that ground.
In urging that the city exceeded statutory limitations in
its levy, the appellant relies upon the Municipal Bond Act
of 1901 which provides that a municipal legislative body has
power to levy and collect "a tax sufficient to pay the annual
interest on such bonds, and also such part of the principal
thereof as shall become due before the time for fixing the
next general tux levy." (Stats. 1901, p. 27; Deering's Gen.
Laws, 1937, Act 5178, § 7.) The statute also provides that the
taxes levied and collected for the purpose of meeting interest
and sinking fund requirements on bond issues shall be' used
"for no other purpose than the payment of said bonds and
accruing interest. " (§ 7.)
Unquestionably these limitations upon the authority of the
city were enacted for the protection of both the property
owner and the bond holder. Taxes Inay be levied for the pur-
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HAROLD L. DAVIS, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] .Attorneys at Law-Disbarment-Proceedings_Procedure Be-

[2a, 2b] ld. - Disbarment-Proceedings-Review_Evidence_Ad_
missions of Embezzlement.-In a proceeding to review the
recommendation of disbarment of an attorney for conduct
involving moral turpitude, even assuming that the client told
the attorney he could keep rings' deposited with him as security for fees in defending third persons charged with crime,
his admission that the pledgor had demanded the return of
the rinA's and that he had given no notice of s:tle thereof
showed that he embezzled the property.
[3] Pledges-Remedies-Demand on and Notice to Pledgor.-A

pledgee is required to give notice to a pledgor and It reasonable opportunity to redcem his property before making a sale
of the pledge.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys at Law, § 172 (11); [2,6,
7] Attorneys at Law, § 176; [3] Pledges, § 71; [4] Attorneys at,
Law, § 28; [5] Attorne;y:sat Law, § 35.

~'-

ing with property pledgcd to him by a client, the attorney's
professional duty requires him to act toward the client in the
utmost good faith and comply with the law respecting bailments;
[5] ld.-Relation to Client-Presumption of Invalidity of Dealings.-An agreement between an attorney and his client by
which the attorney receives any advantage is presumed to be
void, and the burden is upon the attorney to provf,} that th(\
client freely entered into the agreement. This burden is ,not
sustained as to an alleged embezzlement of property' pledged
as security for fces where it appears· that the· client,: because
of drug addiction, was not responsible, alid that on, the one
qccasion when the attorney talked to her about the property
she had not fully recovered from the effects of the dr;ug.
[6] ld. - Disbarment - Proceedings - Review-Evidenc~Flling
False Pleading.-A charge that an attorney filed a false veii~
fied cross-complaint in It client's action against him to recover
rings deposited as seeurity for fees, was supported by his
testimony admitting the fnlsity of the allegations and a~
tempting to excuse his action, and by that of a bail bond
broker by whom he attempted to justify his action in disposing of the rings.
[7] ld. - Disbarment - Proceedings - Review-Evidence-False
Testimony.-A charge of perjury against an attorney in a
deposition in a client's action to recover rings deposited with
hinl was supported where the evidence, including the testi..
mony of the attorney in the disbarment proceeding, conclusively showed that the attorney did not, as stated in the
deposition, dcliver them to the bail bond company as col~
lateral security, but that he pawned them and converted the
money to his own use when the court forfeited the bail bond;

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of disbarment. Petitioner disbarred.
Morris Lavine for Petitioner.
Claude Minard, Guy Hichards Crump, -;Louis W. Myers,
B. E. Ahlport and Paul Vallee for Respondent.
THE COUR'r.-This proceeding was brought to review the
recommendations of the Board of Governors of The State Bar
that the petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law.
[4J ::3ce 3 Cal. JUl'. (j16; 5 Am. Jur. 288.
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[4] Attorneys at Law-'Rcl:ttion to Client-Good Faith.-In deal-
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fore Board-Taking Additional Evidence-Additional Findings.-In fulfillment of its duty to make findings of fact in all
disciplinary proceedings, the Bo:trd of Governors of The State
Bar may adop;; or reject the findings of the local Itdministrative committee in whole or in part, and, without a trial
de novo, may take additional evidence and make other findings.

DAYIS V. STATE nAR
[20 O. (2d) 3321

pose of paying interest and instalments of principal upon the
bonds, but that money may not ue diverted into other channels. I believe that the appell:mt's allegation..:; of fact showing
a violation of this statute state a cause of action.
For these reasons; as I read the authorities, the jndgment
should be reversed with directions to overrule the demurrer
and allow the respondent to answer.

